Das Infanterie-Regiment Generalfeldmarschall von Mackensen Nr. 129 (3rd Westpreußisches) 11te Kompanie in 1914.
It Begins.
JR129 was to begin the First World War as a member of the 36th Infantry Division, headquartered in Danzig. The 36th Division was composed of the 69th Infantry Brigade, which included the 129th, and the 175th Infantry Regiments, and the 71st Brigade, which included the 5th Grenadiers and the 128th Infantry Regiments. The 36th Field Artillery Brigade was also attached which included the 36th and 72nd Field Artilleries. The cavalry component was the 5th Hussars. The 36th Division was combined with the 35th Division to form the XVII (17th) Armee Korps, commanded by General August von Mackensen (see our page dedicated to Von Mackensen). The 17th Armee Korps, along with the I (1st) and XX (20th) Korps was one of the three active korps of the 8th Armee.
The division moved quickly following its mobilization, this was likely assisted by the fact that many of its troops, including the 129th, had been involved in the 1914 Kaiser Maneuvers when mobilization occurred and therefore were already prepared. The regiments were busy the first few days of the war, “absorbing reservists, staging practice marches, sending detachments in their new field gray uniforms to cover beaches, bridges, and roads against expected Russian raids. Hair was cut short or completely shaved in the interests of hygiene. Pastors announced God’s blessing on the war in open-air services, and all but the most committed Socialists or agnostics could be pardoned for joining in the hymns more enthusiastically than usual. In Danzig and Konigsberg, in Allenstein, Lyck, and a dozen smaller towns, troops marched to the railway stations under flying colors, headed by their regimental bands, forcing their way through cheering crowds of well-wishers. Cigars, candy, and enthusiastic embraces from women of all ages helped submerge any lingering qualms in the ranks and among the spectators.” (Showalter,146) By August 11th the 36th Division had disembarked the trains at Montowo, East Prussia and concentrated with the rest of the 17th Korps near Soldau.
The division moved quickly following its mobilization, this was likely assisted by the fact that many of its troops, including the 129th, had been involved in the 1914 Kaiser Maneuvers when mobilization occurred and therefore were already prepared. The regiments were busy the first few days of the war, “absorbing reservists, staging practice marches, sending detachments in their new field gray uniforms to cover beaches, bridges, and roads against expected Russian raids. Hair was cut short or completely shaved in the interests of hygiene. Pastors announced God’s blessing on the war in open-air services, and all but the most committed Socialists or agnostics could be pardoned for joining in the hymns more enthusiastically than usual. In Danzig and Konigsberg, in Allenstein, Lyck, and a dozen smaller towns, troops marched to the railway stations under flying colors, headed by their regimental bands, forcing their way through cheering crowds of well-wishers. Cigars, candy, and enthusiastic embraces from women of all ages helped submerge any lingering qualms in the ranks and among the spectators.” (Showalter,146) By August 11th the 36th Division had disembarked the trains at Montowo, East Prussia and concentrated with the rest of the 17th Korps near Soldau.
Trial by Fire at Gumbinnen.
The Russians invade German Territory.
On the night of August 19th, “Mackensen’s men faced a twenty-five-kilometer night march from their original concentration area on the Angerapp River before reaching their assigned departure point from the Rominte River. The 17th Korps had several days of rest. The soldats’ peacetime experience indicated that the march was well within the capacity of the active soldiers and young reservists who swelled its ranks. Advancing to a first battle, however, imposed a different set of stresses than the most difficult peacetime exercises. The roads were crowded with civilians escaping their homes in the face of lurid stories of Russian outrages. Bawling cattle and bleating sheep, lost kinder seeking their parents, and women and old men seeking to protect what they could in the absence of husbands and sons called to arms added a discouraging mosaic to the untested German infantryman. Reports shot through the marching columns. Cossacks had occupied the Angerapp crossings in their rear. The Russian Guards were formed ahead and preparing to attack. The roads ahead were strewn with mines. In the daytime this could have been shrugged off or cockily laughed away. “In the darkness men thrown on their own resources found it easy to take counsel of the little, formless fears that made Napoleon describe two-o’clock-in-the-morning courage as among the rarest of military commodities.”
Circumstance further added stress and fatigue to the men. The streams of refugees continuously forced the marching columns to deviate from the main roads onto irregular, unpaved lanes. Field kitchens and supply wagons rolled over in the twilight or bogged down in sand. Constant halts, countless times every hour, broke the marching pace. Muscles cramped and joints stiffened during breaks too short to give any relief. The army put a great deal of importance on singing by the enlisted men. This was not meant to be an example of high morale to please the officers, but as a way to keep men moving forward. It provided a diversion from the marschstiefels and the tornisters of the man in front. By dusk the voices of 17th Korps were quiet. The leading squads in a company may continue to sing out of respect for or fear of the officer leading them; however no one else was feeling harmonious.
As the sound of firing from Francois’ 1st Korps sector became louder, nervous officers forced the speed. It then began to rain. It was a cold, steady trickle that proved a strong contrast to the heat of the day and quickly enhanced the misery of the marching men. In all but the strictest discipline, any long marching column begins to agonize from an accordion effect. The line expands until the soldats at the end have to double-time to catch the front. Platoons and companies became separated in the rain. They attached themselves to other formations and straggled back to their own units as they could. Mackensen’s regiments were spread thin and exhausted by the time they straggled into their bivouac areas.
It was almost dawn by the time the 17th Korps halted. Artillery batteries pressed onward to their makeshift gun lines. Staff officers dashed back and forth to avoid giving the impression of confusion. Infantrymen dropped onto the soggy ground for any rest they could get. Pitching zelts in the drizzling darkness seemed a stupid idea for the few hours remaining until daybreak. They saw no friendly farmers to offer straw to soften the earth. Few thought it important to waste the hour necessary to unpack, and then repack, heavy tornisters. Here and there an ambitious soldat scraped a small depression to guard himself from the night wind. Most slept where they dropped, lines of men along the road or strewn in the fields stirring and rotating from cold and fatigue, mumbling in their anxious sleep. Fortunate kompanies had field kitchens that kept pace with them, and had cooks to supply their kameraden with hot coffee to ease the jolt of the morning of August 20th.
Mackensen received dispatches at 4:15am that a regiment previously detached from the corps, the 129th was now returning back to him. With that being the case, it is likely that the 129th had no rest at all that night. Mackensen decided to attack at once, and deployed his force. The attack did not fare well as the 35th Division became pinned by murderous Russian artillery crossfire. The 36th Division did no better. They had not bothered to reconnoiter and didn’t realize they were attacking two Russian divisions entirely entrenched and camouflaged amongst small hills and woods. In the meantime air reconnaissance continued to claim that the area was clear of Russians.
“German tactical doctrine called for frontal attacks to be made by lines of skirmishers strong enough to keep the enemy pinned by their own fire action, yet flexible enough to work forward in small groups to within a half- or quarter-mile of the position. The skirmish line – perhaps better called an assault line – would establish fire superiority, then close to about a hundred yards and mount a final, all-in attack with the bayonet, drums beating and bugles sounding. The whole operation was to be prepared and supported by artillery. But this morning officers of the XVII Corps were unwilling to lose time by following the book. Reluctance to risk being considered laggards outweighed the years of training and the suggestions of common sense. Instead, three regiments of the 36th Division stormed heedlessly forward against everything the Russians could throw at them. Along the line Captains and Lieutenants leading from the front were the first to go down.”(Showalter, 181)
“Live officers did not guarantee progress and control. Companies overran Russian trenches, then stood waiting for orders instead of pursuing or consolidating. A lieutenant of the 5th Grenadiers, sent to notify the artillery of his regiment’s position, encountered his division commander, who asked how things stood in the fighting line. When told of the confusion and casualties, the general shouted, “Dig in the way the Russians did!” But too many field and company officers shared the opinion of the Grenadier captain who insisted that “Prussian infantry does not entrench!” Doctrine and regulations accepted the desirability, even the necessity, of field fortifications. Every infantryman carried his own entrenching tool. In peacetime, however, few regiments taught their men to use these clumsy implements. The Germans dug like amateurs. Those who concentrated on deepening their foxholes risked the wrath of superiors who wanted to know why they were not firing on the Russians.” (Showalter, 182)
“The men who tried to advance found confusion magnified by devotion to another peacetime idea of building up the shooting line. The knowledge of years of exercises, long fixed in several infantry drill manuals, said that when an attack mired, new troops should be brought onward as fast as possible to return momentum. Regiment and battalion officers devoted their own reserves, and then began hijacking other troops wherever they could be found. The too-frequent result was that, groups of different regiments found themselves next to each other in the same area, fighting under leaders they didn’t know against a foe they couldn’t see.
Around 12 p.m. Mackensen became conscious that his battle plan was based on a run of singularly unlucky guesses. Both of his divisions were stuck in front of a defensive network no one could see, much less break. Any effort, whether to advance or to dig in, drew fire. A great percentage of the casualties were hit in the head or upper body – wounds demoralizingly likely to be lethal without prompt removal and treatment. Isolated rushes against the Russians continued throughout the afternoon, driven as much by junior leaders’ anxiety or wish to die while trying something as by any orders from headquarters. They were repelled every time. One lieutenant of the 128th Infantry began the battle leading a platoon of seventy-two men, and only three remained at dusk.
The one persisting hope was to find the Russian flank and turn it. Mackensen still had one of his eight regiments uncommitted. The 36th Division’s 129th Infantry arrived late in the morning. At 12:49 p.m. it received orders to advance on the right of its division and roll up the Russian defenses from the left. The 129th was well led and well trained. It was as equal to any regiment in the army. It had literally deployed from maneuvers, and had sufficient time since to assimilate its reservists into their platoons and companies. Its destiny on August 20th exemplifies the tactical complications of the attack at the start of the First World War.
Just as the Germans arrayed they came under heavy rifle and artillery fire. The Russians seemed to have fortified every farm, copse of trees, and every piece of high ground. The 129th’s charge broke down into a sequence of remote brawls for structures or woodlots. When one was vacated, the victors quickly came under fire from two or three others which in their turn had to be taken. It was a platoon commanders’ fight that speedily absorbed battalion, then regimental reserves into fights for tactical purposes that led nowhere. By late afternoon the 129th had disbanded into four detached groups. The colonel and his staff had altered their locations so often that they had lost touch with all the higher headquarters. The Russian flank remained vague
Most of Mackensen’s infantry had marched and fought for over twenty hours without sleep. Ammunition was so low that some of the men were using Russian rifles and cartridges. Canteens were empty. Like many other generals between 1914 and 1918, Mackensen advanced into a void, under a complete misunderstanding of the condition, without trying any kind of scouting to confirm his hurried decisions. He kept forcing his attack well after his mistake should have been realized. Mackensen had learned a lesson, but his men had paid the price. Roughly 30,000 men of the 17th Korps had advanced that day. Over eight thousand had been killed or maimed, surrendered, or were roving aimlessly in 8th Armee’s rear. For now, 17th Korps was ended as a fighting force.
Some runaways from the shattered regiments just kept going; some got as far as the Angerapp before being halted by military police. Once the initial shock passed the vast majority had nowhere to go. Desertion in August, 1914, was an impossible possibility even if one briefly entertained the idea. Besides, Mackensen’s men were still eager soldaten. They had been over marched, undernourished, and severely beaten, but they had survived to fight again.
Not the risks of being shot by military police or the inspiration of regimental flags were as important in rallying 17th Korps as the modest field kitchen. The aromas of cooking, the hearty stew of meat, vegetables, and potatoes that was the army’s principal evening repast, drew stragglers from every direction. Most cooks had made full servings, ignorant of the day’s casualties. A soldat, even from another regiment, could count on two or three full mess tins, along with all the coffee he could handle. It was as good a way as any to prove he was still alive.
Sources for this article include Dennis E. Showalter’s Tannenberg: Clash of Empires and http://www.1914-18.info/erster-weltkrieg.php?u=161&info=36.Infanterie-Divisionhttp://www.1914-18.info/erster-weltkrieg.php?u=203
Circumstance further added stress and fatigue to the men. The streams of refugees continuously forced the marching columns to deviate from the main roads onto irregular, unpaved lanes. Field kitchens and supply wagons rolled over in the twilight or bogged down in sand. Constant halts, countless times every hour, broke the marching pace. Muscles cramped and joints stiffened during breaks too short to give any relief. The army put a great deal of importance on singing by the enlisted men. This was not meant to be an example of high morale to please the officers, but as a way to keep men moving forward. It provided a diversion from the marschstiefels and the tornisters of the man in front. By dusk the voices of 17th Korps were quiet. The leading squads in a company may continue to sing out of respect for or fear of the officer leading them; however no one else was feeling harmonious.
As the sound of firing from Francois’ 1st Korps sector became louder, nervous officers forced the speed. It then began to rain. It was a cold, steady trickle that proved a strong contrast to the heat of the day and quickly enhanced the misery of the marching men. In all but the strictest discipline, any long marching column begins to agonize from an accordion effect. The line expands until the soldats at the end have to double-time to catch the front. Platoons and companies became separated in the rain. They attached themselves to other formations and straggled back to their own units as they could. Mackensen’s regiments were spread thin and exhausted by the time they straggled into their bivouac areas.
It was almost dawn by the time the 17th Korps halted. Artillery batteries pressed onward to their makeshift gun lines. Staff officers dashed back and forth to avoid giving the impression of confusion. Infantrymen dropped onto the soggy ground for any rest they could get. Pitching zelts in the drizzling darkness seemed a stupid idea for the few hours remaining until daybreak. They saw no friendly farmers to offer straw to soften the earth. Few thought it important to waste the hour necessary to unpack, and then repack, heavy tornisters. Here and there an ambitious soldat scraped a small depression to guard himself from the night wind. Most slept where they dropped, lines of men along the road or strewn in the fields stirring and rotating from cold and fatigue, mumbling in their anxious sleep. Fortunate kompanies had field kitchens that kept pace with them, and had cooks to supply their kameraden with hot coffee to ease the jolt of the morning of August 20th.
Mackensen received dispatches at 4:15am that a regiment previously detached from the corps, the 129th was now returning back to him. With that being the case, it is likely that the 129th had no rest at all that night. Mackensen decided to attack at once, and deployed his force. The attack did not fare well as the 35th Division became pinned by murderous Russian artillery crossfire. The 36th Division did no better. They had not bothered to reconnoiter and didn’t realize they were attacking two Russian divisions entirely entrenched and camouflaged amongst small hills and woods. In the meantime air reconnaissance continued to claim that the area was clear of Russians.
“German tactical doctrine called for frontal attacks to be made by lines of skirmishers strong enough to keep the enemy pinned by their own fire action, yet flexible enough to work forward in small groups to within a half- or quarter-mile of the position. The skirmish line – perhaps better called an assault line – would establish fire superiority, then close to about a hundred yards and mount a final, all-in attack with the bayonet, drums beating and bugles sounding. The whole operation was to be prepared and supported by artillery. But this morning officers of the XVII Corps were unwilling to lose time by following the book. Reluctance to risk being considered laggards outweighed the years of training and the suggestions of common sense. Instead, three regiments of the 36th Division stormed heedlessly forward against everything the Russians could throw at them. Along the line Captains and Lieutenants leading from the front were the first to go down.”(Showalter, 181)
“Live officers did not guarantee progress and control. Companies overran Russian trenches, then stood waiting for orders instead of pursuing or consolidating. A lieutenant of the 5th Grenadiers, sent to notify the artillery of his regiment’s position, encountered his division commander, who asked how things stood in the fighting line. When told of the confusion and casualties, the general shouted, “Dig in the way the Russians did!” But too many field and company officers shared the opinion of the Grenadier captain who insisted that “Prussian infantry does not entrench!” Doctrine and regulations accepted the desirability, even the necessity, of field fortifications. Every infantryman carried his own entrenching tool. In peacetime, however, few regiments taught their men to use these clumsy implements. The Germans dug like amateurs. Those who concentrated on deepening their foxholes risked the wrath of superiors who wanted to know why they were not firing on the Russians.” (Showalter, 182)
“The men who tried to advance found confusion magnified by devotion to another peacetime idea of building up the shooting line. The knowledge of years of exercises, long fixed in several infantry drill manuals, said that when an attack mired, new troops should be brought onward as fast as possible to return momentum. Regiment and battalion officers devoted their own reserves, and then began hijacking other troops wherever they could be found. The too-frequent result was that, groups of different regiments found themselves next to each other in the same area, fighting under leaders they didn’t know against a foe they couldn’t see.
Around 12 p.m. Mackensen became conscious that his battle plan was based on a run of singularly unlucky guesses. Both of his divisions were stuck in front of a defensive network no one could see, much less break. Any effort, whether to advance or to dig in, drew fire. A great percentage of the casualties were hit in the head or upper body – wounds demoralizingly likely to be lethal without prompt removal and treatment. Isolated rushes against the Russians continued throughout the afternoon, driven as much by junior leaders’ anxiety or wish to die while trying something as by any orders from headquarters. They were repelled every time. One lieutenant of the 128th Infantry began the battle leading a platoon of seventy-two men, and only three remained at dusk.
The one persisting hope was to find the Russian flank and turn it. Mackensen still had one of his eight regiments uncommitted. The 36th Division’s 129th Infantry arrived late in the morning. At 12:49 p.m. it received orders to advance on the right of its division and roll up the Russian defenses from the left. The 129th was well led and well trained. It was as equal to any regiment in the army. It had literally deployed from maneuvers, and had sufficient time since to assimilate its reservists into their platoons and companies. Its destiny on August 20th exemplifies the tactical complications of the attack at the start of the First World War.
Just as the Germans arrayed they came under heavy rifle and artillery fire. The Russians seemed to have fortified every farm, copse of trees, and every piece of high ground. The 129th’s charge broke down into a sequence of remote brawls for structures or woodlots. When one was vacated, the victors quickly came under fire from two or three others which in their turn had to be taken. It was a platoon commanders’ fight that speedily absorbed battalion, then regimental reserves into fights for tactical purposes that led nowhere. By late afternoon the 129th had disbanded into four detached groups. The colonel and his staff had altered their locations so often that they had lost touch with all the higher headquarters. The Russian flank remained vague
Most of Mackensen’s infantry had marched and fought for over twenty hours without sleep. Ammunition was so low that some of the men were using Russian rifles and cartridges. Canteens were empty. Like many other generals between 1914 and 1918, Mackensen advanced into a void, under a complete misunderstanding of the condition, without trying any kind of scouting to confirm his hurried decisions. He kept forcing his attack well after his mistake should have been realized. Mackensen had learned a lesson, but his men had paid the price. Roughly 30,000 men of the 17th Korps had advanced that day. Over eight thousand had been killed or maimed, surrendered, or were roving aimlessly in 8th Armee’s rear. For now, 17th Korps was ended as a fighting force.
Some runaways from the shattered regiments just kept going; some got as far as the Angerapp before being halted by military police. Once the initial shock passed the vast majority had nowhere to go. Desertion in August, 1914, was an impossible possibility even if one briefly entertained the idea. Besides, Mackensen’s men were still eager soldaten. They had been over marched, undernourished, and severely beaten, but they had survived to fight again.
Not the risks of being shot by military police or the inspiration of regimental flags were as important in rallying 17th Korps as the modest field kitchen. The aromas of cooking, the hearty stew of meat, vegetables, and potatoes that was the army’s principal evening repast, drew stragglers from every direction. Most cooks had made full servings, ignorant of the day’s casualties. A soldat, even from another regiment, could count on two or three full mess tins, along with all the coffee he could handle. It was as good a way as any to prove he was still alive.
Sources for this article include Dennis E. Showalter’s Tannenberg: Clash of Empires and http://www.1914-18.info/erster-weltkrieg.php?u=161&info=36.Infanterie-Divisionhttp://www.1914-18.info/erster-weltkrieg.php?u=203
Tannenberg and the First Battle of Masurian Lakes
Germans entering a town ransacked by Russians.
The morning of the 26th opened with the First Russian Army advancing west towards Konigsberg, meeting light resistance. The troops that had formerly been directly in front of them had moved to south, facing the Second Army's right flank. There was still time to close the gap between the Russian armies and thereby threaten the German movements, which by this point were being reported back to Russian headquarters. Regardless, on the night of the 25th, the Russian field commander sent orders for the First Army to continue directly west to Konigsberg, orders that were intercepted by the Germans due to the fact they were broadcasted without the use of a code.
Due to Francois' delays, Mackensen’s 17th German Korps opened the battle proper. They met the two separated divisions of VI Russian Corps near Seeburg and Bischofstein, turning them both back toward the border in disarray. The right flank of the Second Russian Army was now open. In the meantime, the Russian advance toward Tannenberg continued to be blocked by XX German Corps in front of them. Their only successes were in the center, where XIII Russian Corps advanced toward Allenstein unopposed.
Francois began his attack on the Russian left on the 27th, held by I Russian Corps. His artillery proved to be decisive, and by night the Russians were falling back. In order to help stabilize the line, Samsonov ordered the seemingly successful XIII Corps to abandon Allenstein and turn southwest to help break through at Tannenberg. By the time this maneuver was complete, the bulk of the Russian Second Army were all in the Tannenberg area, consisting of the newly-arrived XII, XV, and part of XXIII Corps.
By the evening of 28 August, the full extent of the danger to the Russians was evident. Their I Corps on the left and VI Corps on the right were both retreating. Meanwhile the center was having serious logistical issues and could no longer hope to maintain an offensive. Samsonov had no option but to order a retreat towards the southeast and attempt to reorganize near the border. In the Meantime, he asked Rennenkampf to forget about Konigsberg for now and turn southwest to help him.
The request was too late. Francois by this time had advanced east to form a line to the south of the Russians between Niedenburg and Willenburg, blocking their line of retreat. At the same time, Mackensen had moved southwest to meet him. The next day the Russian center met these troops on their way to regroup, and realized they were surrounded. A pocket formed east of Tannenberg, near Frogenau, and was pounded by artillery throughout the 29th of August.
Attempts by the Russian First Army to come to their assistance were much too late to help. The German cavalry was effective at delaying them, and by the time the battle was already over their closest unit was still as much as 70 km from the trapped Second Army. Other Russian units were scattered back along the line to Königsberg, leaving the First Army itself in a dangerously spread-out position.
Due to Francois' delays, Mackensen’s 17th German Korps opened the battle proper. They met the two separated divisions of VI Russian Corps near Seeburg and Bischofstein, turning them both back toward the border in disarray. The right flank of the Second Russian Army was now open. In the meantime, the Russian advance toward Tannenberg continued to be blocked by XX German Corps in front of them. Their only successes were in the center, where XIII Russian Corps advanced toward Allenstein unopposed.
Francois began his attack on the Russian left on the 27th, held by I Russian Corps. His artillery proved to be decisive, and by night the Russians were falling back. In order to help stabilize the line, Samsonov ordered the seemingly successful XIII Corps to abandon Allenstein and turn southwest to help break through at Tannenberg. By the time this maneuver was complete, the bulk of the Russian Second Army were all in the Tannenberg area, consisting of the newly-arrived XII, XV, and part of XXIII Corps.
By the evening of 28 August, the full extent of the danger to the Russians was evident. Their I Corps on the left and VI Corps on the right were both retreating. Meanwhile the center was having serious logistical issues and could no longer hope to maintain an offensive. Samsonov had no option but to order a retreat towards the southeast and attempt to reorganize near the border. In the Meantime, he asked Rennenkampf to forget about Konigsberg for now and turn southwest to help him.
The request was too late. Francois by this time had advanced east to form a line to the south of the Russians between Niedenburg and Willenburg, blocking their line of retreat. At the same time, Mackensen had moved southwest to meet him. The next day the Russian center met these troops on their way to regroup, and realized they were surrounded. A pocket formed east of Tannenberg, near Frogenau, and was pounded by artillery throughout the 29th of August.
Attempts by the Russian First Army to come to their assistance were much too late to help. The German cavalry was effective at delaying them, and by the time the battle was already over their closest unit was still as much as 70 km from the trapped Second Army. Other Russian units were scattered back along the line to Königsberg, leaving the First Army itself in a dangerously spread-out position.
Fleeing Russian Troops.
By the time the battle ended on 30 August, Samsonov's Second Army was destroyed, with 92,000 Russian troops captured, another 78,000 killed or wounded, and only 10,000 (mostly from the retreating flanks) escaping. At the great victory of Tannenberg the German Eigth Army suffered 12,00 casualties (compared with 170,000 suffered by the Russians). They were engaged soon again in the battle of Loetzen (part of the 1st Battle of the Masurian Lakes) on September 9. The Germans suffered 40,000 casualties compared with 170,000 suffered by the Russians.
The Drive to Warsaw
Fighting the elements as well as the Russians.
The 36th Division was then assigned to the 9th German Army (Mackensen), subsequently fighting in the battle of Radom on October 6. Radom was part of the first and unsuccessful German Campaign to capture Warsaw. The 9th Army suffered 21,000 casualties. In the battles during the advance upon Warsaw the regiments of the 36th Division, and especially the 5th Grenadier Regiment, suffered considerable losses (principally at Lodz between Nov. 23 and Dec. 6).
On November 11, Mackensen's Ninth Army struck the one corps of Rennenkampf's First Army which was posted south of the Vistula and routed it, capturing 12,000 prisoners. The rout left a gap between the Russian First and Second Armies and the two forces lost contact with one another. In the meantime Scheidemann's Second Army was being flanked and began retreating towards Lodz. The Russians were beginning to realize the urgency of their situation in Poland. The Second Army was now being endangered with encirclement. The Grand Duke was mainly concerned with saving this army and avoiding a duplication of Tannenberg. The Russian Fifth Army had been ordered from Silesia to the Lodz sector and covered 70 miles in only two days. They smashed into Mackensen's right flank on November 18 under appalling winter conditions (at times the temperature dropped as low as -10 degrees). At the same time from the east, along the Vistula River, Germans were attacked by troops of Rennenkampf's Army. The Germans were now the ones susceptible to being surrounded. With determination on their side they fought their way out by November 26, still holding the prisoners from the Russian First Army. Pressure on Lodz continued until December but the Germans were unable to break the Russian defenses. Short on ammunition, the Russians withdrew to form a new and stronger line closer to Warsaw.
On November 11, Mackensen's Ninth Army struck the one corps of Rennenkampf's First Army which was posted south of the Vistula and routed it, capturing 12,000 prisoners. The rout left a gap between the Russian First and Second Armies and the two forces lost contact with one another. In the meantime Scheidemann's Second Army was being flanked and began retreating towards Lodz. The Russians were beginning to realize the urgency of their situation in Poland. The Second Army was now being endangered with encirclement. The Grand Duke was mainly concerned with saving this army and avoiding a duplication of Tannenberg. The Russian Fifth Army had been ordered from Silesia to the Lodz sector and covered 70 miles in only two days. They smashed into Mackensen's right flank on November 18 under appalling winter conditions (at times the temperature dropped as low as -10 degrees). At the same time from the east, along the Vistula River, Germans were attacked by troops of Rennenkampf's Army. The Germans were now the ones susceptible to being surrounded. With determination on their side they fought their way out by November 26, still holding the prisoners from the Russian First Army. Pressure on Lodz continued until December but the Germans were unable to break the Russian defenses. Short on ammunition, the Russians withdrew to form a new and stronger line closer to Warsaw.